The Iranian challenge

OPINION:

Last week’s encounter between three U.S. warships sailing in international waters in the Strait of Hormuz and five Iranian speed boats probably reporting to the Revolutionary Guard could have led to a nasty incident. Instead, only heated rhetoric rather than bullets and missiles flew from the U.S. side in protest of Iran’s provocative acts at sea. A video taken by one of the U.S. men of war clearly showed the Iranian speedboats darting into harm’s way by closing the American ships to within a few hundred yards. And a still unidentified voice broadcasting on the maritime equivalent of CB radio threatened blowing up the warships as the little speedboats approached.

Iranian spokesmen vigorously denied the U.S. allegations declaring that these were “ordinary” operations. Later in the week, Iran released its video version of the incident. That video recorded calm and professional exchanges between the speedboats and warships. No doubt, we will shortly learn whether or not the Iranian video was authentic or fabricated from an entirely different situation in a purposeful deception. But what is most important is to understand the serious nature of this encounter and what must be done to prevent future confrontations from escalating into unintended armed clashes.

From the American perspective, the skippers of the U.S. warships found themselves on the horns of an impossible dilemma. Just over 20 years ago in the Persian Gulf, the frigate USS Stark was struck by an Iraqi Exocet missile, fired in error. Just under 20 years ago, the captain of the Aegis cruiser USS Vincennes mistook a civilian Iranian airliner for an attacking warplane and shot it down killing all aboard. The United States apologized. But skippers in the Gulf took heed. No one wanted to be another Stark or a Vincennes.

Then, eight years ago, while at anchor in Yemen, the USS Cole was hit by a suicide bomber in a high-speed skiff laden with explosives. The ship nearly sank and 17 sailors were killed. The excruciating dilemma remains how to navigate safely between these cases.

Fortunately, U.S. warships have been carefully trained and made ready for such situations, especially under the current commander of Central Command, Adm. William Fallon. But a skipper could still wait too long or not long enough for bad things to happen. After all, who could blame a captain for defending his or her ship as a small boat, possibly chockablock with C-4 or other explosives, raced closer and closer? And, while so-called non-lethal means that could incapacitate these boats without firing a shot or killing anyone exist, they cannot guarantee peaceful resolution.

Iran, of course, has a reason to provoke coalition warships. The image of tiny speedboats challenging the mightiest Navy in the world has great propaganda value. It is possible that factions in Iran might attempt to provoke hostilities by getting Americans to shoot first in order to rally support in the Arab and Muslim worlds against the United States. The question is how far authorities in Tehran will go in playing this game of chicken at sea.

Some hysterics in this country argue that a “shoot first, ask questions later” is the only way to proceed. If Iran provokes or tempts a fight, why not give them one and teach the Iranian Navy a lesson? After all, if the Royal Navy had done exactly that last year, so this reasoning goes, Iranian Revolutionary Guards would not have kidnapped their sailors and marines in the Shatt al Arab. Of course, resistance could also have led to the deaths of many of the lightly armed British sailors who were substantially outgunned and outnumbered.

There is a better way. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet navies often operated at close quarters. Collisions occurred. But both sides realized that such confrontations, especially when some of those units carried nuclear weapons, could have gotten out of hand. So, under the leadership of then-Secretary of the Navy John Warner, both sides signed the Incidents at Sea Agreement to prevent these interactions at sea from turning hot. And, by that stage, the “hotline” between Washington and Moscow had been in place for some time.

We don’t need a hotline with Tehran, at least not yet. But an incidents at sea agreement for the Gulf makes sense. Indeed, such an agreement could include each of the navies operating in the Gulf to prevent an incident from inadvertently turning into a crisis because one or another party made a miscalculation or mistake.

Iran may not be interested. But that is fine, too. If the United States takes this initiative and Iran declines to respond, then provocative acts at sea on their part will be largely seen as hostile, justifying self-defense by American warships. Either way, we stand to win.

Harlan Ullman writes for The Washington Times.