New security directions

OPINION:

The last 20 years of the Bush (father and son) and Clinton I administrations have had far more national security policies, practices (even people) in common than most Americans may realize.

Accordingly, if Hillary Clinton is elected, we’ll probably see a lot of the Clinton I national security people back at work in her administration. The “hand-off” would be largely uneventful, just like it was between George H.W. Bush (the elder) and Bill Clinton, perhaps even collegial — as between Mr. Clinton and George W. Bush (the son), with some significant senior “holdovers.”

Contrast this with other election outcomes: If elected, Sen. Barack Obama would certainly not put Clinton national security people back to work. And, neither Sen. John McCain nor Mitt Romney would conceivably want to put back to work national security people from the administrations of either President Bush.

Democrat or Republican, this is something we should both hope for.

Why so testy about this? The last real bright line in national security policy was the Reagan administration, and even the much-maligned Carter administration had some very bright spots in national security policy. Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Directive 59, for example, was a brilliant — and attention-getting — strategic doctrine that targeted the Soviet leadership.

So, if it’s Mr. Obama, Mr. McCain or Mr. Romney, do we just dust off a few old Reagan or Carter people? Maybe, but also needed will be a new generation of people who can create and operate an entirely new structure for protecting our security interests in the rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world.

Specifically, if we are to survive as a viable nation we must finally neutralize the means for and sponsorship of terrorism. Furthermore, we likely have only a few years to do this before being struck by a terrorist weapon (or weapons) of mass destruction, i.e., September 11, 2001, times 100 or even 1,000.

Our sworn enemies are still out there, getting richer and stronger by the minute — and, despite spending trillions of our dollars we have not been able to bring them down, nor are we likely to with our current national security practices.

We need to do two things: A structural reorganization of the national security decision apparatus and some fundamental new national security approaches.

Here’s a summary of the “structural reorganization” part:

(1) The National Security Council (NSC) should not be merely paper producing “process”; rather, it must be a svelte decisionmaking and tasking apparatus that needs to be “rebooted” by the next President. Accordingly, our next president should hit the ground with a new plan for a revitalized NSC, and implement it on the first day.

(2) The national security relationship with Congress is dysfunctional and in dire need of repair. To fix it, the new president should include the leadership of Congress in a vastly expanded “Gang of Eight” consultative approach to the whole range of national security issues, including diplomatic and military efforts. As some of my recommendations may require legislation, this enhanced national security partnership with the president is the quid for Congress to act.

(3) The traditional roles of the national security departmental secretaries and deputy secretaries should be reversed: The secretaries of defense and state should “run their buildings” while the deputies should be on mostly permanent duty to the NSC, subject to the direction and control of the national security adviser, when he or she is acting for the president in a national security role.

(4) The JCS already has the statutory model (Goldwater-Nichols) it needs to better serve the president; what needs to happen now is for the JCS to work operationally with the newly empowered deputy secretary of defense to more effectively carry out the president’s national security decisions. The chairman of the JCS, who should also be on mostly permanent duty to the NSC, will ensure this happens.

(5) The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) continues to poorly serve the nation, despite the recent organizational facelift and creation of the DNI; fundamental structural and organizational changes are still necessary. Here are just a few:

• The CIA operations division should be totally reorganized and fully integrated with the special operations functions and human intelligence capabilities of the Defense Department. This should be enabled with new legislation and “oversighted” by a small group of Intelligence and Armed Services Committee members. The CIA intelligence analysis function should be merged with the State Department’s INR Division.

• With representative populations of peoples from all over the world who have come here to escape oppressive regimes, there is no good reason we cannot recruit the people we need to collect critical human intelligence in the world.

• No human-centered intelligence mission or operation should be the exclusive province of any one agency or department. — the best-qualified and trained people for the job should always be selected and tasked to do it.

• Most worldwide intelligence operations should be controlled centrally in the United States. No overseas U.S. officials (civilian or military) should be in the loop for these activities except in truly exceptional circumstances.

• The National Security Agency (NSA) should be taken out of the Defense Department and report to the DNI.

• The FBI’s counterterrorism and counterintelligence functions should be taken out of the Justice Department and report to the DNI.

Our past national security failures have most always begun with fundamental intelligence weaknesses, and will begin there again until we fix them. The Intelligence Community remains the most seriously “broken” operational part of our national security structure.

So could there actually be some new national security directions in Washington with an Obama, McCain or a Romney administration? Yes, and long overdue — but “new directions” won’t improve our safety and security unless we also change the structure for their operation — and include the Congress as a full partner.

Daniel Gallington is a senior fellow at the Potomac institute for policy studies.