OPINION:
OP-ED:Fear is the greatest stimulus for a tyrant, fanning the flames of his regime. It is natural then that in order to overcome his or her own fears, the dictator goes to great lengths to be an even greater threat to others. This trafficking in fear is the reign of terror.
In North Korea, President Kim Jong-il’s greatest fear is being irrelevant and ignored, by his own people as well as in international circles. As long as he has nuclear weapons, he will always be the center of attention. The world has been beating a path to his door in an effort to probe his motivations, offer deals or, foolishly, attempt to talk him out of them. For the same reason, trying to remove Kim Jong-il’s nukes directly will be futile. He must be induced to come to see that having nukes-for-show-but-not-for-use is a two-edged sword that works sharply counter to his own interests.
The North Korea problem cannot be solved militarily. The way to cope with Kim Jong-il is to isolate him emotionally as well as politically. When the international community becomes indifferent to him, Kim Jong-il’s interest in provoking instability will wane. But the simple act of shunning, benign neglect on the part of one or two countries alone, will not suffice to deal effectively with North Korea. The following should be done: First, the “Sunshine Policy” of good-faith dialogues and unconditional assistance, ironically, has served to further impoverish the people of the North, with most of the aid going to the military, while giving their government more opportunities to hone their skills in manipulating other countries. To make the situation worse, it specifically serves to sharpen North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and missile delivery capability.
The Sunshine Policy is not “engagement” as it is touted to be, but rather an exercise in one-sided donations in the hope of buying good will resulting in lasting friendship, even approaching reunification of the divided peninsula. Its shortcoming is that it mistakenly assumes the North Korean government will abandon its policies of hostility and oppression as the sun shines in.
The most serious problem of the Sunshine Policy during the past 10 years is that it tends to confuse the national identity of the South by blurring the line between friend and enemy. Dialogue with North Korea is needed for peace, but South Korea should not engage in talks at the risk of imperiling its core democratic values.
Fortunately, in recognition of North Korea’s rampant inconsistencies, the Sunshine Policy is finally under re-examination and new evaluation in the Lee Myung-bak administration.
Second, the U.S. and China must cooperate to encourage North Korea to adopt economic reforms. The most effective way to make North Korea more responsive would be to initiate a free trade agreement between South Korea and China. Diplomatic recognition between those two countries has been the biggest shock for North Korea, and the most difficult turn of events for them to accept, since the Korean War. Adding a South Korea-China free trade agreement on top of that will be the best possible reality-check to lead North Korea to accept Chinese-style reforms.
Third, although the United States thinks the Middle East is more important than North Korea, the reform of North Korea should be a leading priority for foreign policymakers in the U.S. and China. If the Obama administration wants to be the presidency that finally succeeds in its foreign policy toward North Korea, the White House must make it a priority to gain China’s cooperation.
Finally, China will never allow North Korea into an American-led democracy but will welcome Kim Jong-il if he reforms his country along lines acceptable to China and opens their doors to the international community. China needs to be put into the game and help North Korea understand that reform is in its best interests as well.
Key players in the region, the U.S., South Korea, China and Japan will be better served if they can develop a unified strategy for dealing with the North after Kim’s death.
Conjecture that North Korea will immediately collapse following Kim’s death could be erroneous. Nevertheless, the unwavering continuation of the Kim Jong-il regime cannot be guaranteed. Within one or two years after Kim passes away, the country will reach a peak of instability in the vortex of power struggles, None of his possible successors, including his three sons, have either uncontested party support or the ability to govern the whole country. Absent consolidated leadership, two competing survival scenarios will likely battle it out; one is to adapt to a Chinese-style capitalist economy and the other is to remain mired in Kim-style socialism.
What the U.S. should do is shore up alliances and garner support from all the Northeast Asian nations. Their unified goal should be for North Korea to give up its nuclear manipulations and focus instead on salvaging their economy and joining the international community.
Dr. Young-sun Song is a member of the Korean National Assembly serving on committees for foreign affairs, trade and unification. She is also president of the National Assembly’s Security Forum and a defense and security analyst.
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