Obama adviser Jones shifted Afghanistan views -- a lot

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By Rowan Scarborough

The administration continued the surge in spite of Mr. Jones' advice. A year later, violence in Iraq decreased significantly amid a general consensus that the new strategy had worked.

Mr. McCain also has charged that Mr. Jones was taking too long to coordinate a decision on more troops for Afghanistan.

"This is the strategy that will succeed," he said of the McChrystal plan. "It's a counterinsurgency strategy. A kind that worked in Iraq, adjusted to the different situation and conditions in Afghanistan. We can and will - we can and must succeed there. And the longer we wait, the weeks, then the longer it takes for us to get the much-needed help over there."

Ken Allard, a retired Army colonel, author and military analyst, said he thinks Mr. Jones is fulfilling his role as national security adviser by providing a variety of options.

"James Jones is not someone who just fell off the turnip truck," Mr. Allard said. "He has combat experience, a lot of it. He was commandant of the Marine Corps. He's been NATO commander. So, he's probably the most experienced member of that Obama team from an operational and national security standpoint.

"And so I think any criticism of him would have to be premature at best. Let's see how this thing plays out. Until then, I don't know how you can judge. I think he is superb from what I've seen of him. To this point, I think he's doing a fine job."

In late 2006, Mr. Jones was wrapping up a three-year stint as the first Marine to head NATO, which had assumed major command status in Afghanistan. The debate then was much as it is now. The Taliban had made deep inroads in the south, and the Bush administration was being pressed to increase troop levels. NATO then launched a major offensive to clear villages around the Taliban spiritual capital of Kandahar.

Mr. Jones appeared at the Pentagon to deliver a relatively upbeat message.

"I think [the Taliban] are probably doing some severe analysis about their tactics and what they chose," he said. "Where they'll reappear, I don't know. There's no doubt in my mind that with the coalition and [international] forces, that we have enough troop strength to counter anything they want to throw at us."

A little more than a year later, he headed the study group that called for more troops.

At the Pentagon, he said, "It is going well in the regions where we had permanent presence. In the south there was no such presence; there is now. This is the test, this is a moment of - the moment of truth. I'm hopeful that in the near future the south will become as peaceful as the north and parts of the west are."

A relatively short time later, he signed a letter, with study group co-chairman Thomas R. Pickering, that said, "The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country. The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces."

Mr. Jones said in The Times' interview last Friday that after the big NATO offensive in the south, the Taliban changed tactics.

"The Taliban took us on almost conventionally because they evidently believed that NATO wouldn't fight," he said. "The seven or eight countries that put combat troops to do the fighting in [Regional Command] South dealt them a major blow tactically.

"And if you recall it was such a heavy blow that in the spring of '07 there wasn't much of a spring offensive. That was a major hit and ever since then the Taliban tactics have changed. They're hit and run. Small skirmishes. Squad-size activities. Platoon-size at the most. They clearly learned a lesson there that taking on NATO forces frontally was not a good strategy."

Mr. Jones recalled his last meeting as NATO commander with the North Atlantic Council, the military alliance's governing board.

"I started questioning whether we were paying enough attention to things like combating drugs, combating corruption, effective governance, rule of law and the cohesion that has to exist between security, development and good governance. So those three pillars," he said.

"I told them that I thought that failure to demand better performance across those three pillars and more cohesion was going to prolong our involvement and could lead to major problems in the future. So on that score I think I've been very consistent since '05."